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Abstract—Most user authentication methods and identity prov-
ing systems rely on a centralized database. Such information
storage presents a single point of compromise from a security
perspective. If this system is compromised it poses a direct threat
to users digital identities. This paper proposes a decentralized
authentication method, called the Horcrux1 protocol, in which
there is no such single point of compromise. The protocol relies on
decentralized identifiers (DIDs) under development by the W3C
Verifiable Claims Community Group and the concept of self-
sovereign identity. To accomplish this, we propose specification
and implementation of a decentralized biometric credential
storage option via blockchains using DIDs and DID documents
within the IEEE 2410-2017 Biometric Open Protocol Standard
(BOPS).
Index Terms—Blockchain, IEEE BOPS, self-sovereign identity,
authentication factors, digital identity, distributed authentication
architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital transformation, mobility and the proliferation of
applications and networks have made traditional forms of
information protection increasingly difficult to manage and en-
force. Information is everywhere, access is widely distributed,
but most security programs are still largely based on archaic,
static models that just dont work anymore and it is getting
worse.
The latest evidence of this is recent breach disclosed by
Equifax [10] that has exposed identity information for over 140
million individuals. Enterprises continue to take on enormous
risk by aggregating unnecessary personal data while customers
cant manage the massive number of IDs, passwords and data
required to interact with every on-line connection.
We believe that the common denominator across most
aspects of information protection is identity. An identity is
inextricably linked to a person, device, application, system or
network and it is the most dependable perimeter we can rely
upon to determine how to make information available properly
and securely. Identity management will soon have to make the
leap from our age-old approaches of multiple user IDs and
passwords to a new, secure, privacy-centric means of identity
authentication.
An identity ecosystem leverages personas that can both
protect privacy (and reduced liability for the enterprise),
1The term “horcrux” comes from the Harry Potter book series in which the
antagonist (Lord Voldemort) places copies of his soul into physical objects.
Each object is scattered and/or hidden to disparate places around the world.
He cannot be killed until all horcruxes are found and destroyed.
provide distributed access to authorized services and provide
the user a full-control over their identity accessing. User
authentication presents one of the basic security requirements
in this identity ecosystem. Generally speaking, authentication
can be described as a process in which a user offers some form
of proof that he is the same user who registered the account.
A proof of identity can be any piece of information that an
authentication server accepts: something users have in their
possession, something they know or something they are (e.g.,
a biometric).
A. Traditional Authentication models
In current practice, only one centralized database is in
charge of storing the data used for authentication. When the
user offers the requested proof of identity, the authentication
server evaluates this proof and grants access to the user.
For example, when a user tries to access his account on a
typical web application he is prompted to enter a password.
Traditionally, the web application holds the information about
the users account and his password. When the user submits
his password during log-in process, the application compares
the stored password to the submitted password. If they match,
the user is granted access to the application. In other words,
all the information needed to authenticate the user is held on a
single system. Even if the authentication system is biometric-
based system, most of the deployed systems is still use the
same centralized model.
Biometric-based authentication systems [12] operate in two
main stages: enrollment and recognition. The enrollment stage
generates a digital representation of an individual’s biometric
trait and then stores this representation called biometric tem-
plate in a centralized system database. During the recognition
stage, which can be operate in two modes: verification and
identification, the system require that the acquired probe
biometric template to be matched against a single template
(in the verification mode) or all template (in the identification
mode) stored in the centralized database.
This makes such systems the single point of compromise for
securing digital identities. In other words, in case an attacker
gains access to the web application or the biometric centralized
database, he can extract enough information to compromise
the users digital identity [11]. Moreover, since many users
tend to use the same password or biometric trait in different
applications, revealing their identity on one compromised
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database can lead to unlawful access into other accounts and
services.
In some current implementations, the authentication server
can be completely separated from the server running web ap-
plications or biometric authentication database . For example,
single sign-on (SSO) schemes [21] are based on this concept.
SSO schemes rely on a third-party identity provider (IdP)
to broker authentication using protocols such as SAML [9]
and OpenID Connect [26]. Since their introduction in 2002
and 2010 respectively, only 5% of sites use any of over 50
disparate IdP [28] SSO services (e.g., “login with Facebook”,
“login with Google”, etc.). Loopholes in these centralized IdP-
based SSO systems are the main reasons for the many hacks of
personal information [10] and even loss of biometric data [29].
Surveys of users show an overwhelming dissatisfaction with
single-sign-on (SSO), a feeling of “lack of control” over their
data [3], [18], [24], [27] and a desire to control it themselves.
Upcoming legislation, such as the General Data Protection
Regulations (GDPR) [13] and Payment Services Directive II
(PSD2) [7], are pressuring institutions, both private and public,
to place citizen or customer data into the end user’s control.
B. Traditional Identity Proving Methods
Current identity proving methods (see Figure 1) rely on
specific parties: an issuer, end-user, verifier, and inspector.
Issuers such as governments associate identity credentials
to end-users. Then, the issuer shares personal information
and credentials of the end-user with a verifier. If the end-
user applies for a bank account, credit card, or car loan,
the inspector contacts a verifier to prove the claimed iden-
tity by the end-user. Therefore, especially if this process is
online, the inspector presents a multiple-choice quiz about
past addresses or who financed the user’s last car. Thats an
identity verification service that verifier provides to lenders
and others, i.e., inspectors. Based on the answers or prove of
holding the credentials, the inspector will verify the claimed
identity by the end-user and grantee the required service.
This ecosystem has the same security flaw as the traditional
authentication systems, end-user personal data (e.g., SSN,
addresses, birthdate, etc.) are stored in a centralized database
of the verifier.
C. Our Contribution
The aforementioned security flaws encapsulate perfectly
why a new identity ecosystem is so important: identity is the
new attack surface [14]. In traditional authentication and iden-
tity models, users are forced to relinquish personal information
such as credit histories, credentials such as birth certificate, or
biometric data such fingerprint template to a third party, with
a centralized database.
Self-sovereign identity is a new decentralized ecosystem for
private and secure identity management that is being imple-
mented by several projects [22], [4], [16] as the replacement of
the traditional identity proving systems. Self-sovereign identity
puts end-users not the organizations that traditionally central-
ize identity in charge of decisions about their own privacy and
Fig. 1. Traditional Identity Proving Ecosystem.
disclosure of their personal information and credentials. Self-
sovereign identity utilizes distributed ledgers, i.e., blockchain
technology, to establish a web-of-trust [6]. These blockchains
are a form of databases that is provided cooperatively by a
set of organizations, instead of by a central database with a
central organization. A single blockchain is copied redundantly
in many places, and it accrues transactions orchestrated by
many machines. In other words, the new identity model is a
reliable, public identity proving system under no single entitys
control, robust to system failure and hacking.
In this paper, we discuss the specification and implemen-
tation of our Horcrux protocol that combines the decentral-
ized self-sovereign identity ecosystem with 2410-2017 IEEE
Biometric Open Protocol Standard (BOPS)[1]. The BOPS
protocol is extensible to a combination of on-device (FIDO
UAF [2] compatible), server-side or a multi-distribution model
that utilizes a secret scheme. Indeed, the standard allows
for off-device biometric credentials under user control. The
devices local TPM is only one option (though dominant at the
moment) for persisting biometric credentials and associated
key(s).
The Horcrux protocol allows the end-users of self-sovereign
identity to have the control of accessing their identities by
giving the consent to this verification process via a biometric
authentication process. Moreover, We propose the use of the
existing BOPS due to its multi-distribution scheme of storing
biometric data. BOPS utilizes a secret scheme to divide the
templates into n ≤ 2 shares as specified in IEEE 2410-
2017. Therefore, biometric data used for authentication will
be distributed by BOPS and securely stored in decentralized
storages and securely referenced to them by blockchains
technology. The multiple shares (and potentially redundant
shares) could be spread across alternate off-chain storage (like
IPFS, Dropbox, Google drive, etc.) as designed in the self-
sovereign ecosystem.
This marriage of these two identity models (DIDs and
BOPS) is the Horcrux protocol which guarantees the following
principles:
• Existence: users must have an independent existence that
can not only exist wholly in the digital form, and by using
biometric-based protocol for enrolling and authentication,
this guarantees that the digital identity has been created
and will always be verified by an existence end-user.
• Control: users must control the storage and access to their
identities. Under the Self-sovereign identity ecosystem,
users always able to refer to, update, or even hide
their personal information and credentials. Our Horcrux
protocol will assure that the access is always secure
by their biometric which also is securely stored via
the decentralized ecosystem, along with their personal
information.
• Portability and interoperability: BOPS and self-sovereign
identity have been designed around these principle.
• Protection: the security of Horcrux protocol is trusted
because it is based on strong cryptography and governed
by self-sovereign identity via a blockchain technology
and BOPS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections II and
III present IEEE Biometric Open Protocol Standard (BOPS)
and Self-sovereign identity ecosystem, respectively. Section IV
discuss our Horcrux protocol and its implementation. Finally,
Section V summarizes the paper.
II. BOPS
Biometric authentication demands high assurance levels
such as those required by national and international standards
[8]. The IEEE 2410-2017 Biometrics Open Protocol Standard
(BOPS) [1] defines the following elements to achieve required
levels of assurance:
• Collection: BOPS defines application programming inter-
faces (API) such that biometric templates (fingerprints,
facial, voice, etc.) are collected via a hardware security
module (HSM), trusted execution environment (TEE) or
trusted platform module (TPM) when possible. Such
facilities ensure non-accessible and/or encrypted memory
to prevent exfiltration of biometric data.
• Storage: BOPS defines secure formats and envelopes
such that biometric data persisted via encryption using a
hardware security module (HSM), trusted execution envi-
ronment (TEE) or trusted platform module (TPM) when
possible. Such facilities ensure non-accessible and/or en-
crypted memory to prevent exfiltration of biometric data.
BOPS also accommodates methods for cryptographic
sharding [25] such that a share is kept locally on the
device and a second share can be kept locally or sent
to the remote platform. Loss of either share does not
compromise the complement share nor the biometric
template.
• Transmission: BOPS defines a Representational state
transfer (REST) interface protocol such that no biometric
is transmitted unless it is encrypted in within an envelope
using the server’s public key (per enrollment) over a two-
way TLS channel.
• Processing: BOPS requires matching of biometric tem-
plates in volatile memory or using the local HSM, but
never persisted to any form of non-transient storage such
as files, databases, or other long-term storage media.
BOPS defines two phases of operation: enrollment and
authentication. During enrollment, the remote server generates
a public-private key pair (RKP) in which the public key is sent
to the mobile device. Then, a biometric template (called the
initial biometric vector or ”IBV”) is collected and paired with a
device-generated public-private key pair (LKP) using the local
HSM when available. The LKP private key is reserved locally
and the LKP public key along with the biometric share(s) are
encrypted with the RKP public key for transmission to the
server over a two-way TLS connection. The client certificate
for the TLS connection is installed a priori via application
installation on the mobile device.
Biometric authentication requires collection of a candidate
biometric vector (CBV) for comparison to the IBV. BOPS
defines three configuration modes for authentication:
• Local: The collected CBV is compared on the device to
the reconstructed IBV shares. The match result can be
a threshold value or a boolean that is encrypted in an
envelope using the RKP public key and transmitted to
the server. This mode is FIDO UAF [2] compliant when
used with a certified local FIDO UAF authenticator.
• Remote: The collected CBV is encrypted in an envelope
with the RKP public key and transmitted to the server for
comparison on the remote server.
• Local Match: The server is requested to encrypt (using its
RKP private key) any IBV shares it holds and return them
to the local device. The CBV is collected, IBV share(s)
from local and remote combined and matched on the local
device. The CBV and combined IBV are subsequently
wiped from volatile memory.
• Remote Match: The collected CBV and any local IBV
share(s) are encrypted in an envelope with the RKP
public key and transmitted to the server. On the server,
the incoming IBV share(s) from the local device are
combined with server-based share(s) and compared to the
incoming CBV.
The BOPS protocol also uses one-time password and server-
based challenges in envelopes to prevent man-in-the-middle
(MITM) and replay attacks that might threaten the security
of biometric data and other credentials in transit. A recent
comparison [15] shows that FIDO UAF and BOPS offer rough
comparable protection against such threat vectors. In Local
configuration mode, BOPS and FIDO UAF are comparable,
but BOPS offers additional modes for remote (and sharded)
storage and matching. Remote storage and match of biometric
data may not be appropriate in some jurisdictions and regu-
latory regimes, but it depends on each institution’s policies,
cyber security standards, risk compliance levels and assurance
needs.
III. SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM
Self-sovereign identity is a new identity ecosystem where
individuals (or even organization) to whom the identity per-
tains, control and manage their identities. In this sense the
individual is their own identity providerno external party can
claim to provide the identity for them because it is intrinsically
theirs. In other words, self-sovereign identity is as a digital
record or container of identity transactions that end-users
control. The end-user can add more data to it, or ask others
to do so, reveal some the data or all of it some of the time or
all the time.
Moreover, end-users can record their consent to share data
with others, and easily facilitate that sharing. It is persistent
and not reliant on any single third party. Claims made about
an end-user in identity transactions can be self-asserted or
asserted by a 3rd party whose authenticity can be indepen-
dently verified by a relying party. The infrastructure of self-
sovereign identity has to reside in an environment of diffuse
trust which is not controlled by any single organization or even
a small group of organizations. The cryptographically secure
blockchain is the breakthrough technology that makes this
possible. It enables multiple entities such as organizations and
governments to cooperate mutually via distributed consensus
to form decentralized blockchains, where data is replicated
in multiple locations to be resistant to faults and tampering.
While distributed ledger technology has been around for some
time, new blockchain applications, such as Bitcoin, have
resulted in realizations of its potential, particularly with respect
to decentralization and security.
Fig. 2. Self-sovereign Identity Ecosystem architecture.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the self-sovereign identity
architecture. The followings are the brief descriptions of the
architecture entities. Note that in this architecture, the informa-
tion is no longer centralized and connections are individually
permissioned.
• DID: Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of
identifier intended for a self-sovereign identity system,
i.e., entirely under the control of an entity and not
dependent on a centralized registry or certificate authority.
DIDs are opaque, unique sequences of bits, that get
generated when a user accepts a claim from an issuer
along with a corresponding DID Document. DIDs have a
foundation in (Universal Resource Identifiers) URIs[17],
[23]; therefore, they achieve global uniqueness without
the need for a central registration authority.
• DID document: A DID resolves to an corresponding DID
Document — a simple document that contain all the
metadata needed to interact with the DID. Specifically,
a DID Document typically contains at least three things
along with personal information or credentials. The first
is a set of mechanisms that may be used to authenticate as
a particular DID (e.g., public keys, biometric templates,
or even encrypted share of biometric data). The second
is a set of authorization information that outlines which
entities may modify the DID Document. The third is a
set of service endpoints, which may be used to initiate
trusted interactions with an entity[23].
• Blockchains: In this architectural construct, the
blockchain acts as an index of identifiers and audit
trail of permissioned exchanges between the issuer of
claims, the holder of claims, and the inspector of claims.
• Identity hubs and repositories: These hubs are secure
personal data repositories that curate and coordinate the
storage of signed/encrypted DID documents, and relay
messages to identity-linked devices. Examples of identity
hubs include Dropbox, Google drive, and Storj.
• Issuer: Anentitythat creates DID and DID documents,
associates it with a particularsubject and transmits it
to aholder. Examples of issuers include corporations,
governments, and individuals.
• Inspector/Verifier: Inspectors request claims in the form
of DIDs from subjects and organizations in order to give
them access to protected resources. Theinspector verifies
that the credentials provided via DID and in the DID
document are fit-for-purpose, also checks the validity
of the DID in the blockchain. Examples of inspectors
include employers, security personnel, and websites.
• Holder: Holders receive DIDs from issuers, store DID
Documents via identity hubs, and provide DID Docu-
ments to inspectors. The entity which controls a particular
DID can be the subject of the DID document, but not
necessarily. An inspector can also resolve DIDs into their
corresponding DID documents and discovery DIDs across
a decentralized system. Examples of holders are users
— students, employees, and customers. Other examples
of holders that have the permissions to handle subjects
claims include web services or mobile apps installed on
the subjects personal devices.
IV. THE HORCRUX PROTOCOL
The IEEE 2410-2017 standard allows for interoperablility
at several layers including the persistence cluster ([1] section
7.3.3) provided it satisfies security requirements for storage
of encrypted biometric shares. We propose any BOPS server
can act as a holder of biometric shares via blockchain using
methods outlined in the W3C Decentralized Identity (DID)
specification[23]. A BOPS server can enroll a user by storing
biometric share(s) as DID Documents using off-chain storage
providers owned by the user. The corresponding DID acts as
the identity assertion associated with the enrolled biometric.
Figure 3 depicts a standard BOPS enrollment flow (adapted
Fig. 3. Enrollment sequence
from [1] section 7.2). The user (via a browser user-agent) is
prompted to enroll their biometrics with a service provider
acting as an issuer. The initial biometric vector (IBV) is
encrypted (via visual cryptopraphy) into two shares. One share
is reserved on the local mobile device while the second is
transmitted to the BOPS server. Instead of an RDBMS or per-
sistence cluster (e.g., SOLR) backend, the BOPS server relies
on a blockchain store in this case using a decentralized identi-
tifer (DID)[23] for persistence. DIDs provide a blockchain-
agnostic method for resolving DID Documents much like
URIs [17] uniquely characterize web resources via URNs and
URLs, but for disparate blockchain ecosystems. The W3C
Verifiable Claims Community Working Group has defined
DID method specifications [23] for implementors of CRUD
operations specific to a particular blockchain. The BOPS
server acts as a resolver given a DID to fetch the corresponding
DID Document if possible. The DID and corresponding DID
Document are cryptographically associated with each other via
blockchain transactons such that any tampering with the DID
Document for a given DID would be evident. After persisting
the DID document and registering the associated DID on a
blockchain, the user is notified of success (or failure) of their
enrollment. It should be noted that no biometric shares are
stored on any blockchains, only in DID Documents that are
persisted “off-chain” via identity hubs or personal storage
providers.
The encrypted biometric share is still within an encrypted
envelope as per [1] but the share is persisted on a correspond-
ing blockchain with an associated DID. The DID can be used
as a claim with another BOPS server acting as a verifier.
Again, this is possible because any tampering with the DID
Document associated with a given DID will be detectable due
to their relationship via a recorded blockchain transaction[23].
Figure 4 shows an example of a different BOPS server being
used by a verifier. In this example, the user tries to access
a resource on a web site (e.g., the service provider) using a
mobile client application (MCA) with a DID created by an
issuer (3) and a public key created at enrollment. The service
provider relies on a BOPS server to resolve the DID and fetch
the corresponding DID Document via a blockchain from the
storage provider. If the DID document is a valid claim, the
BOPS server checks if the issuer of the claim is known (via
its public key in the DID document) and that the enrollment
public key matches for this user as well. If valid, the user
(via their MCA) is requested for their candidate biometric
vector (CBV) and complement share of the IBV as per [1].
Upon receiving the complementary share and CBV from the
client (as described in II - Remote configuration mode), the
enrollment public key is used to decrypt the client’s share,
combine the IBV shares and match them to the CBV. If
successful, the user is authenticated.
In the case of remote authentication, the service provider,
acting as a verifier, uses a different BOPS server instance
to authenticate the user even though this user has never
registered at this service provider. Furthermore, the user and
service provider are the only parties needed at authentication
time unlike SAML or OAuth that rely on 3rd party identity
providers (IdPs) to broker identity claims in traditional single-
sign-on (SSO) systems. The Horcrux protocol supports self-
sovereign identity [5] by using blockchain technology to secure
credentials issued by valid authorities (i.e., issuers) for later
use directly by the user who owns the credentials. The user
may store such credentials via several personal cloud storage
providers such as Dropbox, Google drive, Amazon S3, etc.
Fig. 4. Remote authentication sequence
but delegate management (via OAuth tokens) to a holder such
as the BOPS server. The holder can access issued claims
like the ecnryoted biometric shares on behalf of the user
during authentication, but require biometric authentication as
specified in the authenticationCredentials section
of the claim [23].
The local configuration mode of BOPS is also available
such that a combination of biometric shares occurs on the
mobile device. Figure 5 shows this variation in which the
second biometric share is retreived via DID referencing from
the corresponding DID document but transmitted to the client
by a service provider and its BOPS server. The biometric share
is opaque to the service provider and BOPS server in this
case, but the server knows that the corresponding share on
the mobile device is used for matching due to the HMAC of
the encrypted second share. The enrolled share is never sent
to the device, but both shares are kept locally as per BOPS
local configuration mode. The mobile device must hold the
private key associated with the enrolled share for the DID
because it computes an HMAC using the share and sends it to
the server. The server can compare the HMAC key with the
opaque encrypted share from the DID document. It is possible,
however, that the user could resolved a given DID, retrieve the
corresponding DID document, extract the opaque encrypted
share and construct the HMAC thus spoofing possession of that
share and falsifying the biometric match. We are in the process
of investigating methods for securing DIDs on a mobile device
and/or using server-based key mechanism to prevent this attack
vector.
The IEEE 2410-2017 standard allows for more than two
encrypted shares. Algorithms such as visual cryptography
[25] and Shamir secret sharing [19] allow for larger number
of shares that. Using DIDs and associated DID documents
for more biometric shares across different blockchains and
replicating copies of shares could further protect users from
compromise and increase availability.
V. SUMMARY
The self-sovereign identity model provides authority-based
issuance of claims and eliminates the need for 3rd-party iden-
tity providers during authentication using blockchain technolo-
gies to assure exchange of verifiable credentials. The Horcrux
protocol is a method for secure exchange of biometric creden-
tials within an existing standard (IEEE 2410-2017 BOPS [1])
implemented across next-generation blockchain-based self-
sovereign identity platforms based on open standards like
DIDs and DID Documents [23]. By using blockchain and
off-chain storage as an alternative to the persistent layer in
BOPS, we use new blockchain-agnostic standards to enroll
via an issuer and authenticate on a verifier that are not
part of an real-time trust network. Instead, they rely on
user-controlled biometric credentials that are cryptographically
encrypted into multiple shares across the user’s device and
blockchain-linked personal storage providers. The protocol is
generalized for two or more biometric shares that can be stored
across mobile devices and personal storage providers with
redundancy for availability and safety. Future plans include a
Fig. 5. Local authentication sequence
reference implementation and detailed analysis of the protocol
for performance and correctness using TLA+ in a manner
similar to the protocol analysis of WPA found in [20].
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